Comparative Environmental Risk Assessment: Nigeria and Bangladesh

Introduction

This paper compares the environmental risk factors shaping instability in Nigeria and Bangladesh. Both nations face intertwined pressures from population growth, poverty, and environmental degradation, but the ways those risks play out differ. Nigeria’s challenges stem from oil dependence, desertification, and deep regional inequality, while Bangladesh faces flooding, salinization, and the threat of climate-driven displacement. Drawing on Diehl and Gleditsch’s Environmental Conflict: An Anthology (2001), this analysis highlights how demographic stress, limited resources, and institutional weakness interact to heighten the potential for ecological conflict.

Figure 1 — Political Map of Nigeria:

Figure 2 — Political Map of Bangladesh:

Population Pressure

Population growth sits at the core of both countries’ environmental strain. Nigeria’s population has surpassed 230 million and continues to grow at a rate of about 2.4 percent annually, with a median age under 19 (UN DESA, 2023). This youth bulge puts heavy pressure on housing, education, and jobs, especially in the north, where desertification and insecurity push families southward. Migration into major cities, such as Lagos and Abuja, fuels unplanned urban expansion and competition over scarce water and land resources (Cincotta 2017).

Bangladesh tells a different story but with a similar outcome. It is one of the most densely populated nations in the world, with an average of over 1,200 people per square kilometer (World Bank, 2023). Each monsoon season forces millions to move, swelling urban slums and straining sanitation systems. Environments (2023) notes that this constant movement transforms temporary displacement into a normal survival strategy, linking environmental stress directly to social instability.

In short, Nigeria’s demographic challenge is tied to economic opportunity and governance, while Bangladesh’s is rooted in geography. Both fit Diehl and Gleditsch’s (2001, 39–41) idea of “compound scarcity,” where social and environmental pressures reinforce each other until stability begins to erode.

Poverty and Socio-Economic Stress

Despite vast oil wealth, Nigeria remains one of the poorest large economies. According to the National Bureau of Statistics (2022), about 40 percent of Nigerians live below the poverty line. Oil revenues rarely reach local communities, especially in the Niger Delta, where contamination and unemployment fuel frustration. Adeniran (2020) argues that inequality and pollution together create a cycle of resentment and protest that undermines trust in government.

Bangladesh, by contrast, has cut poverty in half since 2000 through garment exports and overseas remittances, bringing the poverty rate to around 18 percent (World Bank 2023). Yet, those gains are fragile. Repeated flooding and cyclones erase livelihoods overnight. BMC Public Health 2023 describes how families fall into “climate poverty traps,” rebuilding only to lose everything again after the next disaster.

Both countries show how poverty and environment interact: economic hardship drives unsustainable land use, deforestation, and overfishing, which then deepen poverty. This feedback loop mirrors Diehl’s broader argument that deprivation and degradation often feed one another more than they can be separated.

Resource Scarcity and Management

In Nigeria, oil dominates nearly every aspect of environmental management. The Niger Delta produces more than 90 percent of export revenue but suffers from chronic spills—roughly 13 million barrels since 1958 (Okoli 2022). Polluted waterways and ruined farmland leave residents without livelihoods. Farther north, the shrinking of Lake Chad—down 90 percent since the 1960s—has intensified clashes between farmers and herders competing for land and water (Diehl and Gleditsch 2001, 113).

Bangladesh faces its own scarcity, but water—not oil—is at the center. The country shares 54 rivers with India, and upstream withdrawals disrupt irrigation and drinking supplies. Rising salinity from sea-level rise pushes saltwater deep into once-fertile areas. Environments (2023) explains that disputes over river management ripple through rural economies, increasing inequality and migration.

Both examples reveal that scarcity becomes a political issue when institutions cannot manage it. Nigeria’s centralized oil system and Bangladesh’s transboundary river dependency both create vulnerability, but for opposite reasons—one from over-exploitation, the other from lack of control.

Environmental Degradation

Nigeria’s environmental losses are visible on land. Desertification in the north advances roughly 0.6 kilometers each year, threatening more than 15 million hectares of farmland (FAO 2022). Deforestation for agriculture and fuelwood erodes topsoil and worsens flooding during rainy seasons. Unregulated mining adds contamination to already stressed aquifers. The United Nations (2023) lists Nigeria among the world’s ten most degraded nations.

Bangladesh’s degradation is largely coastal. Sea levels rising about 7 millimeters annually could submerge 17 percent of its land and displace 10 million people by 2050 (IPCC 2023). Saltwater intrusion now stretches nearly 100 kilometers inland, harming rice yields and prompting many farmers to turn to shrimp ponds that further degrade mangroves. Urban air pollution, driven by brick kilns and traffic, compounds the health risks.

Diehl’s framework helps explain the common thread: ecological decline weakens livelihoods, and when survival feels uncertain, social cohesion frays. Nigeria’s degradation comes mostly from land misuse; Bangladesh’s comes from the sea. Either way, both demonstrate how environmental stress can quietly evolve into a security risk.

Table 1 – Key Environmental Risk Indicators (2023 data)

Category

Nigeria

Bangladesh

Comparative Risk

Population (millions)

230

172

Nigeria higher strain on infrastructure

Annual growth rate %

2.4

1.0

Nigeria faster growth

Poverty headcount %

40

18

Nigeria higher poverty

Access to safe water %

70

88

Better in Bangladesh

CO₂ per capita (t)

0.7

0.6

Comparable

Deforestation % annual

3.5

1.0

Nigeria greater loss

Flood exposure % of population

12

28

Bangladesh higher exposure

Sea-level rise impact

Low to moderate

High (coastal loss)

Bangladesh greater risk

Desertification impact

High (north Sahel region)

Low

Nigeria greater risk

(Sources: UN DESA 2023; World Bank 2023; FAO 2022; IPCC 2023.)

Comparative Analysis

Although the environmental threats differ, the underlying vulnerabilities are remarkably similar. Both Nigeria and Bangladesh struggle with rapid population growth, poverty, and weak governance. The difference lies in how those pressures surface.

In Nigeria, environmental issues often turn violent. Oil wealth fuels corruption, while northern desertification drives internal migration and clashes between herders and farmers. When the state cannot mediate disputes, ecological stress translates directly into security problems.

In Bangladesh, the danger is slower and more diffuse. Flooding and coastal erosion cause constant displacement, and the burden of adaptation falls on poor households. The government has invested in disaster management, but as McCormick (2018) notes, even effective democracies can struggle when short-term politics overshadow long-term environmental planning.

Comparatively, Nigeria shows greater conflict potential due to institutional failure, while Bangladesh faces higher environmental exposure due to geography. Diehl and Gleditsch (2001, 157–59) stress that regime type alone does not determine success—capacity does. Both nations demonstrate that environmental security depends on functioning, inclusive institutions rather than on democracy in name only.

Regional cooperation efforts illustrate this. Nigeria’s Lake Chad Basin Commission and Bangladesh’s Ganges-Brahmaputra treaties both attempt to manage shared resources but suffer from inconsistent funding and enforcement. Non-governmental organizations, such as the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) in Bangladesh and local conservation networks in Nigeria, fill part of that gap; yet their work also highlights what’s missing—sustained government accountability.

Synthesis

Across these two cases, environmental conflict risk emerges from the same intersection: population pressure, poverty, and fragile institutions. Neither Nigeria’s oil wealth nor Bangladesh’s economic growth has broken that cycle. Both show that resilience is not just about resources but about governance—the ability to plan, coordinate, and share benefits fairly.

Where governments manage stress transparently, as Bangladesh has done with its cyclone-shelter network and community warnings, environmental shocks become manageable. Where they fail, as in parts of Nigeria’s Delta region, even abundant natural wealth becomes a source of instability.

Conclusion

Nigeria and Bangladesh represent two sides of the same sustainability challenge. Their problems differ—land versus water—but both stem from uneven development and fragile institutions. As Diehl and Gleditsch (2001) argue, unchecked environmental degradation erodes not only ecosystems but also political legitimacy.

For Nigeria, lasting stability will require economic diversification and stronger environmental regulation in oil-producing areas. For Bangladesh, resilience will depend on continued investment in adaptation and fair water-sharing with its neighbors. In both nations, the question is not whether they can grow, but whether they can grow without exhausting the systems that sustain them.

These findings set the stage for the next phase of analysis—evaluating policy responses in Milestone 3—to determine which national and international strategies show the greatest promise for turning environmental risk into long-term security.

References

Cincotta, Richard. 2017. “Population Age Structure and Its Relation to Civil Conflict: A Graphic Metric.” Environmental Change & Security Program Report. Washington, DC: Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/population-age-structure-and-its-relation-to-civil-conflict-graphic-metric

Diehl, Paul. 2001. Environmental Conflict: An Anthology. Boulder, Colo: Routledge. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=200605&site=eds-live.

Dode, R. O. 2012. “The Political Economy of the Resource Curse and the Challenge of the Niger Delta Crisis.” European Journal of Sustainable Development 1 (2): 141–55. https://ecsdev.org/ojs/index.php/ejsd/article/view/16

Environments. 2023. “Transboundary Water Governance Scholarship: A Critical Review.” Environments 10 (2): 27. https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3298/10/2/27

FAO. 2022. State of the World’s Forests 2022. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/f81551bf-0a78-498b-a0a6-17f21467389d/content

Hassan, R., Hossain, M., Mahbub, M. et al. Unhealthy food consumption and its determinants among children aged 6–23 months in Bangladesh: insights from the Demographic and Health Survey 2022. BMC Public Health 25, 2498 (2025). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-025-23668-2

IPCC. 2023. Sixth Assessment Report: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/

Mai-Bornu, Zainab Ladan. 2020. Political Violence and Oil in Africa: The Case of Nigeria. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-45525-5

McCormick, John. 2018. Environmental Politics and Policy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/978-1-137-60032-2

NBS (National Bureau of Statistics). 2022. Multidimensional Poverty Index Report. Abuja: Government of Nigeria. https://nigerianstat.gov.ng/elibrary/read/1241103

UN DESA. 2023. World Population Prospects 2023. New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. https://population.un.org/wpp/

UNEP. 2023. Global Land Outlook Update. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme. https://www.unccd.int/resources/global-land-outlook

Vishwanath, Ambika. 2018. “Paddling Upstream: Transboundary Water Politics in South Asia.” Carnegie India. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2018/10/paddling-upstream-transboundary-water-politics-in-south-asia?lang=en

World Bank. 2023. Poverty and Equity Brief: Bangladesh. Washington, DC: World Bank. https://databank.worldbank.org/source/poverty-and-equity-data-portal

World Bank. 2024. World Development Indicators: Nigeria and Bangladesh. Washington, DC: World Bank. https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators

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Milestone 2 – Introduction, Literature Review, and Comparative