So far, Israeli leaders have focused more on the military mission than what comes after
During the lead-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Secretary of State Colin Powell gave President George W. Bush advice that became known as the Pottery Barn rule: “You break it, you own it.” In other words, invading a country and overthrowing its government means you’re ultimately responsible for the governance of that country going forward, whether you like it or not.
A version of this dilemma faces Israel as it contemplates a widely expected ground offensive into Gaza. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed that Israel’s military operation will “crush and destroy” Hamas. But Hamas is not only the terrorist organization that killed 1,400 Israeli citizens in the attacks on October 7; it's also the governing authority for the roughly 2 million people of Gaza. If it is “destroyed,” who and what will replace it?
Defense Minister Yoav Gallant made Israel’s most explicit comments on the subject to date on Friday, telling a meeting of the Knesset’s foreign affairs and defense committee that the destruction of Hamas would be followed by “the creation of a new security regime in the Gaza Strip, the removal of Israel's responsibility for life in the Strip.”
But the comments didn't answer the question of who would take on that responsibility.
Michael Koplow, chief policy officer of the Israel Policy Forum, said that Gallant’s reference to a “new security regime” implied that there would be “some Israeli involvement” in a post-war Gaza, but that it would not “involve Israel running things day to day.”
The Israeli military kept a presence in Gaza before 2005, and in southern Lebanon before 2000. But Koplow told The Messenger that these examples, both of which ended with Israeli military withdrawals, suggest that such an arrangement is probably unsustainable.
“Any situation in which there is a Palestinian-run administration in Gaza, but Israel has carved out a security zone is, in the long run, going to cause a lot of headache for Israel,” he said.
Tough questions
The Times of Israel reported earlier this week, citing U.S. officials, that the Biden administration has been pressing the Israeli government to flesh out its post-war strategy before sending in the troops. But the paper also said that “Netanyahu and his inner circle have indicated to their American counterparts that Israel has not yet come up with such a strategy and is more focused on the immediate goal of removing Hamas.”
Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, Gilad Erdan, told CNN, “We’re not thinking now what will happen the day after the war… We need to win this war, and that’s the only thing that we’re focused on.”
There are ongoing discussions on the issue, however. Former Defense Minister Benny Gantz and former Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot, both erstwhile Netanyahu opponents, demanded the creation of an exit strategy for Gaza as a condition of joining Netanyahu’s emergency cabinet last week, and have now been tasked with establishing a committee to do just that.
One post-war change already on the table is that Israel would no longer allow Gazans to enter Israel for work. Until this month, a small number of Gazans were permitted to work in Israel, in an arrangement that allowed for a certain amount of economic growth in Gaza. Many hoped the arrangement would make Hamas militants less likely to attack Israel. That assumption was clearly wrong.
“Israel will not be part of the solution in terms of giving [Gazans] work. We’ve disconnected the umbilical cord,” one official told the Financial Times.
No good options
But no officials have put forward publicly any answers to the question of who will actually run Gaza’s affairs, assuming Israel succeeds in destroying Hamas.
In a recent column, Koplow laid out possible post-war scenarios for Gaza. By his own admission, all have serious flaws.
One would involve Israel actually running the Gaza Strip. As RAND Corporation analyst Raphael Cohen told The Messenger last week, “I don't think there's a whole lot of appetite [in Israel] to be the primary provider of services to 2 million people who really do not want you.” Gallant’s comments Friday would seem to rule this idea out.
Another scenario would leave Hamas’s political wing in place to rule Gaza, after its military capabilities were destroyed. After the events of Oct. 7, this is unlikely to be acceptable to the Israeli public, and given that armed struggle against Israel is Hamas’s raison d’etre, the group is unlikely to see its appeal either.
Other local political movements might eventually emerge to govern Gaza, but Hamas has actively suppressed any opposition to its rule over the territory since it took power in 2006–the last time Gaza held elections. There are no obvious political alternatives.
Other Arab governments, including neighboring Egypt, are unlikely to be interested in administering a territory that was already in desperate humanitarian straits before last week’s bombing campaign began.
Lastly, there is the possibility that the Palestinian Authority, which currently governs the West Bank, would take over administration of Gaza.
Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid has publicly supported this option, but it’s unclear what sort of legitimacy the Authority would have in Gaza. The Fatah party, which currently controls the Palestinian Authority, fought a civil war with Hamas for control of the territory in 2007, and has had no presence there since. In any event, President Mahmoud Abbas and his security forces have their hands full in the increasingly restive West Bank, where they have never been less popular or seemed less relevant to unfolding events.
For now, the question of how Israel can defeat Hamas militarily is daunting enough. And much as American commanders concentrated on the removal of Saddam Hussein from power rather than what would follow in Iraq, back when the “Pottery Barn” warnings were made, the conversation in Israel now is focused on getting rid of Hamas. But many analysts warn that the country may find that even a hard-won victory will be only the beginning of its difficulties.