A facially neutral veteran-status requirement draws only rational-basis review absent discriminatory intent.
The District of Massachusetts dismissed a self-represented gay police officer's constitutional challenge to the denial of retirement service credit under the Massachusetts HERO Act, concluding that the officer's equal protection and due process theories failed because the statute and its application are neutral on their face and the complaint alleged no facts suggesting discriminatory intent by the state or the agency. The officer had alleged that he was unable to actually serve in the military due to the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy. The court also found that the plaintiff likely lacked standing, because the discrimination he described was attributable to the federal government rather than to the Boston Retirement System (Coleman v. Boston Retirement System, No. 1:26-cv-10894-LTS (D. Mass. Oct. 13, 2026)).
The plaintiff, who is gay, joined the Navy's Delayed Entry Program in 2006. He withdrew later that year to become a Boston police officer, a position he has held since. The officer alleged he withdrew because of the federal government's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy and Article 125 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which criminalized homosexual conduct.
New state law. In 2024, Massachusetts enacted the Honoring, Empowering, and Recognizing Our Servicemembers and Veterans Act. Among other things, the statute permits veterans who qualify for state public-employee retirement systems to purchase up to four years of creditable service based on prior military service. The Act defines "veteran" by reference to length of active duty and the nature of the discharge or release, wartime service, or the award of certain campaign badges.
In August 2025, the officer applied to the Boston Retirement System (BRS) for creditable service, explaining that he had been unable to serve because of laws barring service by gay people. BRS requested a DD-214 discharge form. The officer responded that he had been denied military service and sought "equitable access" to the buyback opportunity. BRS denied the application in September 2025 because the officer had not served in the military and so was not a veteran under the Act. Its letter acknowledged the unfairness of his situation but said it was bound by state law, and suggested an appeal or legislative redress.
The officer appealed to the Division of Administrative Law Appeals, which dismissed the appeal and explained that an administrative tribunal could not entertain his constitutional claims. He then filed an objection raising his statutory claims with the Contributory Retirement Appeal Board, where the matter remained pending.
Court action. In February 2026, he sued BRS under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count I alleged an equal protection violation in the denial of his application. Count II alleged a due process violation. Count III alleged an equal protection violation arising from what he called the "Veteran Preference Cascade," the broader system of veteran preferences in Massachusetts employment, housing, education, and benefits. BRS moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
Equal protection. The court began its analysis with Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), in which the Supreme Court held that a state veterans' preference is neutral on its face even if federal policies historically kept most women from becoming veterans. Under Feeney, such a classification receives only rational-basis review unless the plaintiff shows discriminatory intent.
Applying that framework, the court first considered the statute itself. Section 4(1)(h) classifies only by whether an applicant completed qualifying veteran service and does not mention sex, sexual orientation, or any other protected class. The officer therefore had to plausibly allege that the Legislature acted with discriminatory intent in 2024. He did not. The court rejected his reliance on Massachusetts's failure to repeal old sodomy and unnatural-acts statutes dating to 1641 and 1879, noting that he conceded those laws have been unenforceable since Lawrence v. Texas. Failure to repeal unenforceable laws, the court reasoned, does not generally suggest discriminatory intent in passing other legislation. If anything, the state Senate's unanimous 2024 vote to repeal those statutes pointed the other way. The court likewise found that the state's failure to ban the so-called gay and trans panic defense has no bearing on the Legislature's intent in defining eligibility for service-credit purchases. The officer's remaining evidence concerned only the federal government and was irrelevant to state intent.
Absent discriminatory intent, the classification needed only a rational basis. The court observed that the complaint did not explain why offering retirement benefits to qualifying veterans lacks one, and noted that Feeney itself upheld a similar Massachusetts veterans' preference.
The court then turned to BRS's denial. Because the officer conceded he is not a qualifying veteran, denying him veteran service credit was a facially neutral application of the statute. He alleged no selective enforcement and no disparate treatment of similarly situated applicants. The legislative and criminal-law evidence bore even less relation to BRS, an agency that administers retirement benefits and has no connection to the criminal laws he cited, and federal policy had no bearing on BRS's intent. The denial easily satisfied rational-basis review, and BRS's expression of sympathy in its denial letter did not undermine its rational basis for following the statute. Counts I and III were therefore dismissed.
Due process. To the extent Count II asserted procedural due process, it failed at the first step because the officer, who concededly is not a veteran under the Act, had no legitimate claim of entitlement to the benefit and therefore no protected property interest. On substantive due process, the court acknowledged that the doctrine protects intimate personal autonomy. But BRS denied the benefit because the officer was not a veteran, and the denial did not interfere with his personal autonomy in any respect.
Standing. Although the Rule 12(b)(6) analysis was sufficient, the court added that lack of standing also appeared to compel dismissal. To the extent Count III attacked civil service examinations, Boston Police Department promotion policies, and Boston Fire Department transfer procedures, BRS is not the proper defendant because it neither controls nor could redress them. More broadly, the officer did not show that any of his injuries were fairly traceable to BRS, since the discrimination he described was perpetuated by the federal government.
The court granted BRS’s motion to dismiss and directed entry of judgment of dismissal, with each side bearing its own fees and costs. In a footnote, the court declined to reach BRS's ripeness and stay arguments given the dismissal, while noting that Massachusetts law provides for judicial review of final agency adjudicatory decisions in superior court, where constitutional challenges may be considered.