The limitations period is governed by where the applicant received notice of the employment decision, not where the employer made it.
The Eighth Circuit has affirmed the dismissal of an applicant’s disability and race discrimination claims, holding that the 180-day deadline for filing an EEOC charge applied because the applicant was notified in Arkansas that his conditional job offer had been withdrawn, even though the employer made the decision at its Kansas headquarters. The court also concluded that the applicant’s race discrimination allegations were too conclusory to state a claim and upheld the district court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law negligence claim (Stephens v. Harcros Chemicals, Inc., No. 26-1310 (8th Cir. Oct. 29, 2026)).
Conditional employment offer. The plaintiff, an African American Arkansas resident, applied for a warehouse driver position at the Little Rock, Arkansas, facility of Harcros Chemicals, Inc. Harcros extended a conditional offer of employment, but later withdrew it after i3Logix, Inc., co-defendant, reported that the applicant had tested positive for a marijuana metabolite.
The applicant told i3Logix and Harcros’s hiring manager that he had not used marijuana. He explained that he had consumed half of a CBD gummy to address anxiety related to atrial fibrillation. In his complaint, the applicant alleged that he was qualified to be a commercial truck driver when the offer was made and that, despite being informed of his disability and his use of a hemp product, Harcros declined to consider whether the result was a false positive. He further alleged that Harcros did not respond to his email asking it to begin its process for returning to duty and never engaged in an interactive process to accommodate his disability.
Harcros is headquartered in Kansas City, Kansas. The applicant submitted a charge of disability discrimination to the EEOC’s Kansas City office 266 days after he learned the offer had been withdrawn. The EEOC dismissed the charge and issued a right-to-sue letter, and the applicant sued Harcros and i3Logix in the Eastern District of Arkansas. He asserted claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, along with a state law negligence claim against i3Logix.
The district court granted i3Logix’s motion to dismiss, noting that the applicant conceded his Title VII, ADA, and ACRA claims did not apply to i3Logix and finding that he had not alleged racial animus sufficient to support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. With no federal claim remaining against i3Logix, the court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the negligence claim. It granted judgment on the pleadings to Harcros because the EEOC charge was untimely and the complaint lacked facts showing race discrimination. The applicant appealed.
Timeliness. The appeals court reviewed the dismissal de novo, accepting the complaint’s factual allegations as true and drawing reasonable inferences in the applicant’s favor. An ADA plaintiff must first file an EEOC charge within 180 days, or within 300 days if a state or local agency has authority to provide relief from the challenged conduct. Arkansas has no such agency, so the 180-day period applies there. Kansas has one, which extends the period to 300 days. The court noted in a footnote that the regulation on which it relied was in effect when the applicant filed his charge and has since been repealed, with filing deadlines now published on the EEOC’s website.
The applicant argued that Kansas’s 300-day period governed because Harcros made the decision to withdraw the offer in Kansas. The court found that argument inconsistent with circuit precedent. Under Hutson v. Wells Dairy, Inc., 578 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2009), the limitations period begins when termination occurs, which is when the employer notifies the employee of its decision. Because termination takes effect upon notice, the court reasoned, it occurs where the employee is notified. The court pointed to Hutson itself, which applied Nebraska law where the employee received notice at the Omaha airport.
The court also identified prudential reasons for a site-of-the-notice test. Looking instead to where the decision was made could be susceptible to manipulation by employers, a concern recognized in decisions from district courts in Tennessee and Florida. It was undisputed that the plaintiff applied for the job in Arkansas and was notified of the withdrawal in Arkansas. The district court therefore correctly applied Arkansas’s 180-day period, and because the charge was filed after 266 days, it was untimely and the disability claim was subject to dismissal.
Race discrimination claim. To state a race discrimination claim under Title VII and § 1981, the court explained, a plaintiff must allege membership in a protected class, discriminatory intent by the defendants, protected conduct, and interference with that conduct by the defendants. At the pleading stage, the plaintiff must allege facts that plausibly support each element and threadbare recitals of the elements, supported only by conclusory statements, are insufficient.
The applicant alleged that Harcros discriminated against him because of his race by failing to thoroughly investigate his claim of a false-positive drug test, withdrawing the offer, and hiring a less qualified person outside the protected class. He offered no further detail about the person hired or any other facts supporting discriminatory intent. As to i3Logix, he alleged only that it intentionally misrepresented his explanation about using a hemp product, and he said nothing about racial animus. The court concluded that the complaint rested on conclusory statements and a threadbare recitation of the elements, which failed the plausibility standard, and that the district court properly dismissed the claims against both defendants.
Supplemental jurisdiction. Finally, the appeals court reviewed the refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for abuse of discretion. A district court generally declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when all federal claims have been dismissed. Because the district court dismissed every federal claim and only the negligence claim against i3Logix remained, and because the applicant identified no basis for finding an abuse of discretion, the court found none. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.